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Nevertheless, the legal rights of the journal will remain by the present publishersontos verlag and Philosophia Verlag. There will be no changes in the editorial staff or the Editorial Board. As a new member of the Editorial Board we cordially welcome Francesco Orilia from Macerata, Italy.

We would like to express our gratitude to all our readers for their loyalty through the past years.

Rafael Hüntelmann
Editor in Chief

ARTICLES

RICHARD BRIAN DAVIS

Is Socrates A Predicate?

ABSTRACT

In his *Moderate Realism and Its Logic* (Yale, 1996), Donald Mertz argues that the traditional ontology of nonpredicable substances and predicable universals is beset by “intractable problems,” “harbors an insidious error,” and constitutes a “stumbling block” for the ontologist. By contrast, a one-category ontology consisting of relation instances (and combinations thereof) is sustainable, and indeed the only way of avoiding commitment to bare particulars. The success of the project turns on Mertz’s claim that every relation instance has a linking aspect, so that (in a sense) even Socrates is a predicate. I argue that, ironically, it is this very feature of a relation instance that undermines Mertz’s entire theory of predication, effectively preventing any connections from being formed between the instances that allegedly compose an ordinary individual such as Socrates.

One of the deliverances of traditional ontology is that a distinction must be made between *individuals*, on the one hand, and their *properties* or *attributes*, on the other. Consider the proposition *Socrates is wise*. According to the tradition, in asserting this proposition I single out an individual (i.e., Socrates) for attention, and predicate of him the property of wisdom or being wise. And this is as it should be. A property is the sort of thing one predicates of an individual but not the other way round. Surely it would be absurd, for example, to predicate a thing such as Socrates of (say) the property *being wise*, or the set of all Greek philosophers, or indeed anything at all. For Socrates just isn’t the right sort of thing to serve as a predicate. While individuals *have* properties—that is, are property bearers—they aren’t themselves predicative; they cannot be attributed to or characterize anything. Rather, individuals are unique and wholly unrepeatable particulars.

All of this can seem no more than the sober truth. In his *Moderate Re-*

alism and Its Logic, however, Donald Mertz launches a full-scale assault on the tradition, charging that it is beset by “intractable problems,” “harbors an insidious error,” and constitutes a “stumbling block” for the ontologist (1996, 8, 15). Hardly a glowing report. What, precisely, is the problem? Mertz claims that if facts are assayed into impredicative individuals and the predicative n -adic universals true of them, then in effect Socrates is a bare (propertyless) substratum. But arguably the notion of a bare particular is incoherent.¹ Mertz’s proposed solution is nothing less than a Copernican Revolution in ontology. To avoid the slide to bare particulars, he says, we must indulge in a bit of role reversal. We must hold, first, that it is individuals that are predicative while universals aren’t predicates at all. Furthermore, predication involves a single ontological category and not the traditional two. For individuals are substance-like enough to sustain ontological ‘attachments’, while at the same time (*qua* ontic predicates) effecting those very ‘attachments’.

The picture that emerges here is of an interconnected world of individuals predicated of (and only of) other individuals. All of this is made possible, we are told, by an individual extraordinaire—the *relation instance*, at once both ontic (i.e., extra-grammatical) subject and predicate. According to one recent endorsement, “[w]ithout entering into the details” of Mertz’s proposal, we can safely assume that it “is a conceptual possibility” even if a bit “unusual” (Morganti, 2004, 98). In this paper I mean to dispute this claim; there are serious problems, I shall argue, precisely *in the details* of the proposal. For the internal resources of the theory, it turns out, cannot assemble an individual such as Socrates solely out of relation instances, thereby triggering an unexpected return to the “insidious” two-category ontology and its commitments.

1. *Characterizing Instances*

Suppose we begin, then, by asking what a relation instance *is* as Mertz sees it. What sort of thing is it? What is its basic nature? The official account goes as follows. Consider a property (i.e., a monadic relation) such as *being wise*. Clearly, we can distinguish between wisdom *in itself* and Socrates’ wisdom, his instantiation of it. The former is a relation *universal*. It is

¹ See Mertz (1996, 72–73). See also Mertz (2001, 2002). For recent attempts to rehabilitate bare particulars by investing them with at least some properties, see Moreland (1998), Moreland and Pickavance (2003). For replies to Moreland’s refurbished theory, see Mertz (2003b) and Davis (2003, 2004).

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JIRI BENOVSKY

A Modal Bundle Theory*

ABSTRACT

If ordinary particulars are bundles of properties, and if properties are said to be universals, then three well-known objections arise : no particular can change, all particulars have all of their properties essentially (even the most insignificant ones), and there cannot be two numerically distinct but qualitatively indiscernible particulars. In this paper, I try to make a little headway on these issues and see how the objections can be met, if one accepts a certain view about persistence through time and across possible worlds – namely, four-dimensionalism and its modal analogue. The paper is especially devoted to the second and third of the three objections.

§1. Bundle theorists argue that concrete particulars are to be analyzed as bundles of properties, rather than as bare particulars that have or exemplify these properties, since they typically reject bare particulars as being unknowable and as having unclear identity conditions. According to this view, a person like my neighbour Cyrano is then nothing over and above the bundle of his properties, among which are, for instance, "having a big nose", "having blue eyes", and "being human". Depending on the account of what properties are, the bundle theory comes traditionally in two versions – according to the first, concrete particulars are bundles of tropes, and according to the second, they are bundles of universals (immanent universals, presumably). The second of these views has been defended only by a minority because it suffers from well-known weighty objections. It is the purpose of this paper to show that things are not as bad as they look, and that the bundle-theory-with-universals view is a respectable piece of metaphysics, although it comes at some serious cost and a certain amount of primitivism.

§2. The first well-known objection can be found, for instance, in Van Cleve (1985, p. 122) : "If a thing were a set of properties, it would be incapable of change. For a thing could change its properties only if the set

* I would like to thank Davor Bodrozic, Fabian Dorsch, Laurie Paul, Gianfranco Soldati, and Juan Suarez for helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

identical with it could change its members, but that is impossible; no set can change its members." Taking an example of an individual that is supposed to change one of its properties over time, he adds : "[...] what we have is replacement of one individual by another, not change in the properties of one and the same individual." (Van Cleve (1985, p. 124)). The idea here is simple, and quite compelling : if an individual is identified with a bundle of properties, then if one of the properties changes, the bundle is not the same, and so, the individual who is the bundle is not the same – it simply ceased to exist, while another individual has taken its place. So, nothing can undergo change in properties.

This objection should sound familiar to those who are interested in the question of persistence through time : it is exactly analogous to the ‘no-change’ objection that is sometimes raised against four-dimensionalism. Four-dimensionalism, the doctrine that ordinary objects are temporally extended and persist through time by having temporal parts at different times, provides an account of change in intrinsic properties in terms of the having of different properties by different temporal parts. My neighbour Cyrano, for instance, has a big nose (say, at t_1). But suppose that he undergoes a plastic surgery operation and so, at t_2 , he has a small nose. What this amounts to, according to the four-dimensionalist, is that one of Cyrano's temporal parts has a big nose, and another has a small one.

When considering the four-dimensionalist's account of change, some object to it by claiming that what we want to give an account of is how a single object, a single individual like my neighbour Cyrano, can change, and the four-dimensionalist is telling us a story about different objects (different temporal parts) having different properties, and this is not the story we wanted to be told. What we have is not change of an individual, but replacement of one changeless object (one temporal part) by another changeless one. So, no concrete particular can ever genuinely change.

But, as many four-dimensionalists have argued, this objection is easily answered. What is intrinsic change ? According to Judith Jarvis Thomson, "a thing changes iff it has a feature at an earlier time which it lacks at a later time" (Thomson (1983, p. 210-211)). Berit Brogaard claims that "change takes place when a single entity has two incompatible states at different times" (Brogaard (2000, p. 341)). Both views follow the traditional view of Bertrand Russell that "change is the difference, in respect of truth and falsehood, between a proposition concerning an entity at a time t and a proposition concerning the same entity at another time t' , provided that the two propositions differ only by the fact that t occurs in the one where t' oc-

curs in the other" (Russell (1903, §422)). The core idea these three views have in common is that change is the having of different properties at different times. But if this is right, the four-dimensionalist's answer to the 'no-change' objection is readily at hand : according to the four-dimensionalist's picture, Cyrano, the four-dimensional entity, has at t_1 the property of having a big nose, and at t_2 the property of having a small nose (by having a t_1 -part that has a big nose and a t_2 -part that has a small nose); he has a feature at t_1 that he lacks at t_2 – and that's all that's required to claim that a change occurs. Surely, an instantaneous temporal part of Cyrano does not change (it will, for instance, always be true that his t_1 -part has the property of having a big nose), but Cyrano does, and this is what we wanted to account for. The four-dimensional individual Cyrano can very well have different properties at different times and can, therefore, change.

Now, let us turn back to the bundle theory. Since Van Cleve's objection is analogous to the 'no-change' objection to four-dimensionalism, it is very easy to adapt the four-dimensionalist's reply to save the case of the bundle theory. The reply, then, goes as follows. (This strategy was pioneered by Casullo (1988, p. 138).)

Granted, if one property of a bundle of properties is taken away and replaced by another, then the resulting bundle is not numerically identical to the original bundle, and so, the original bundle did not change, but was replaced or followed by a new one. But ordinary particulars, like Cyrano, are not such bundles – they are *bundles of bundles*. That amounts to say that ordinary particulars are four-dimensional entities that are extended in time, as well as they are extended in space, by having temporal parts at different times. In the bundle theorist's vocabulary : they are bundles that are made up of bundles which are the temporal parts that make up the whole four-dimensional individual (the bundle of bundles). Now it is easy to see how the bundle theorist can give an account of change in intrinsic properties along the four-dimensionalist's line of thought : Cyrano, has a big nose at t_1 , then he undergoes a plastic surgery operation and so, at t_2 , he has a small nose. There was a bundle at t_1 , that included the property of having a big nose, which does not exist at t_2 , but there is at t_2 a bundle that includes the property of having a small nose. None of those two bundles of properties changed. But Cyrano did. Cyrano is the bundle of those two (and, probably, much more) bundles of properties and he, the four-dimensional individual, can be said to change from t_1 to t_2 , in virtue of having different temporal parts at those two different times. It takes then no more than

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Three accounts of simple dependence - each endorsed by some contemporary philosophers, among them Kit Fine, E. Jonathan Lowe, Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry Smith - are presented and then rejected. A new account, inspired by Fine and Lowe, is defended. According to that account – the “foundational” account - simple dependence is to be defined in terms of a relation called ‘grounding’, which is presented in chapter 3.

Chapters 5 and 6 deal with relations belonging to the family of simple dependence, among others (i) generic dependence, (ii) various forms of temporal dependence, and (iii) supervenience, a complex dependence relation largely invoked in current debates on the philosophy of mind. It is shown that foundationalist accounts of these notions - i.e. accounts framed in terms of grounding – are superior to other existing accounts. These chapters also contain some applications of the foundational concept of dependence, in particular a characterization of substances and a formulation of the distinction between two well known concepts of universals, the Aristotelian and the Platonian concept. The last part of the work is a technical appendix where one can find, among other things, a system for the logic of essence, which is proven to be sound and complete with respect to possible world semantics.

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KURT TORELL

The Chauvinism of Actualism

Consider the Doctrine of Humean Supervenience: ‘all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another...’ (Lewis, 1986, p. vi), and so ‘...for any two worlds w_1 and w_2 , if w_1 and w_2 agree on local particular facts (and so on regularities), they agree on laws of nature’ (Menziez, 1993, p. 196; cf. Carroll, 1994, p. 57). To the degree to which accounts of laws of nature, dispositional properties, and counterfactual conditionals contain this doctrine, they also presuppose an ontological commitment to what I call ‘actualism’. According to actualism, no merely possible things exist; the only things that genuinely exist are, fundamentally, ‘actual’, where something is actual if it exists at some time and has a location in space.

Actualism is an interesting view with interesting implications, for it is a view that conceives the class of existing things to be wholly exhausted by the class of actual things, which means that if something is not somehow accountable in terms of some actual things, it does not, in fact, exist at all. Furthermore, it is a view that seems quite plausible for many folks since it is difficult to conceive in what manner things could exist if they were not actual. On the other hand, one might believe that there are things that exist that are not clearly actual, such as mere possibilities the existence of which is not constituted by, reducible to, or accountable in terms of actual things. For when one asserts a counterfactual conditional statement, such as “If I had a beer here within reach, I’d drink it” (Bigelow, 1999, p. 56), one typically intends the statement to refer to real, existing possibilities that are not actualized in this world; one intends that such a statement is really true of *this* world and about existing features of *this* world, because one expects that there are, in this world, real, existing possibilities, even though those possibilities might remain unactualized. Indeed, to assume otherwise would seem to require assuming that besides what actually happens, nothing else can happen at all. Similarly, our world seems to be populated with dispositional properties that provide things that possess them with potentialities that may remain unmanifested. While the non-actualist, along with C.B. Martin, might very well agree to admit that the

dispositional properties themselves are actual, their unmanifested manifestations, that is, the mere potentialities these properties entail, may be thought to exist even though their existence is not actual.¹ Finally, some time ago, some philosophers did suggest that in order that the sentence ‘All Fs are G’ express a law of nature, as opposed to an accidental generalization, the sentence needed to possess ‘unlimited scope’, which is to say that it needed to refer not only to actual things, e.g. occurrences, but also to possible, but never realized, things (Hempel, 1948, p. 156; Carroll, 1990, p. 190, Menzies, 1993, p. 197 and Note 1, p. 222).² However, if these never realized things do not really exist at all, or their existence is reducible to actual things, then this apparent distinction between accidental generalizations and laws of nature would amount to little distinction at all.

Currently, there are two dominant treatments of laws, both of which appear committed to actualism. First, there is the class of Humean, regularist accounts, the more sophisticated version of which Earman calls the “Mill-Ramsey-Lewis” systems approach (Earman, 1984). According to these accounts, laws are, more or less, regularities of some sort, where any nomic necessity, should there be any, is understood to supervene upon the actual facts of the world, much as the spirit of the Humean Supervenience Thesis would require.³ Secondly, there are the ‘dispositional essentialists’

¹ Consider C.B. Martin’s remark: ‘The dispositions of a thing can change. Dispositions have duration. A piece of glass can be fragile for an hour and cease to be fragile for an hour...The glass need not actually break during the hour that it is fragile.’

We must see that dispositions are actual, though their manifestations may not be. It is an elementary confusion to think of unmanifesting dispositions as unactualized *possibilia*, though that may characterize unmanifested manifestations (Martin, 1994, p. 1.)

² In fact, it would appear that it is because genuine laws statements are intended to refer not only to actual things, but also to possible things, that they are able to support subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals (where the latter are taken to refer to non-actualized possibilities) since putatively true universal statements that lack this feature also do not support subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals.

³ As David Lewis characterizes the connection between the Humean thesis and these regularist accounts of laws of nature, ‘[f]ew would deny that laws of nature, whatever else they may be, are at least exceptionless regularities. Not all regularities are laws, of course’ (Lewis, 1986, xi.) Consider also the following comment where Ellis explains how he sees this thesis entailing a commitment to a world-view where all modal, and hence, dispositional properties must be accounted for in terms of actual, non-modal properties: ‘[t]he thesis that the modal properties of things must all depend on

treatment of laws proposed by such persons as Alexander Bird and Brian Ellis. According to these ‘anti-Humean’ accounts of laws of nature, laws do not *govern* what things do; there is not just one damn thing and then another, where, if there are any laws, they *make* these damn things do what they do.⁴ Rather, the world consists of entities that possess powers, dispositions, propensities, and the like, and the laws of nature are said to be grounded in, or supervene upon, these powers and dispositions in any number of proposed ways.⁵ While such accounts are often contrasted to the aforementioned Humean accounts,⁶ one can see that they too remain

what categorical properties they have, and what the laws of nature are, is sometimes called the *Humean Supervenience thesis*. For, if this theory is correct, it implies that no modal properties can exist as properties in their own right. The existence and nature of all such properties must be fully determined once the categorical properties of things, and the laws of nature are fixed.’ (Ellis, 1999, p. 25)

⁴ In contrast to the dispositional essentialist account he offers, Ellis characterizes the Humean treatment of laws in the following way: ‘[t]he Humean metaphysic...implies that the causal powers and capacities of things are properties which depend on what the laws of nature are. If the laws were different, the Humeans would say, then so must their causal powers be different...The Humean tradition thus embraces the medieval distinction between a substance and its species attributes, which was confirmed at the Council of Trent in 1551 in the doctrine of transubstantiation...What is supposed to occur in the Eucharist is that the wine and bread literally become the blood and body of Jesus, even though all their species attributes (including all of their physical and chemical properties) remain just those of wine and bread. Same observable properties, different substances. No problem, if you think that what a thing is is logically independent of what it does. Mad if you think otherwise.’ (Ellis, 1999, p. 26)

⁵ According to Ellis’ dispositional essentialist account, laws are ‘the identifying descriptions of the basic dispositional properties of things, i.e. of their causal powers, capacities, and propensities. Let P be any such property. Then, necessarily, anything that has P must be disposed to display P in some appropriate circumstances, and the identity of the property displayed must depend on what has to happen in these circumstances. A causal law identifies P by describing both the circumstances C and the display E. The general form of the causal law is therefore: For all x, necessarily, if Px and Cx, then Ex. (Note the position of the necessity operator.)’ (Ellis, 1999, p. 28)

⁶ It is worth mentioning that Ellis and others see the difference between Humean treatments of laws and the treatments of dispositional essentialists as entailing a difference in how laws are thought to hold in worlds. That is, according to the Humean treatments, the laws of a particular world are contingent in the sense that worlds populated with the same actual things could have different laws. According to the dispositional essentialists, they are not contingent in the sense that worlds with the same

committed to actualism in so far as they typically conceive laws to be necessary in the sense that they hold in all worlds where the dispositions upon which they supervene are instantiated.⁷

The aim of the following paper is two-fold. In an effort to establish the counter-intuitive nature of all regularist treatments of laws, I first consider a number of strategies an actualist could employ to account for the existence of potentialities entailed by dispositional properties, and the counter-intuitive consequences that follow from adopting these strategies. Secondly, I attempt to show how stripping away the actualist commitment of the brands of dispositional essentialism that are typically forwarded by Ellis and others yields a view of laws of nature that more squarely matches our intuitions. It is hoped that the former effort results in some reason to conceive our world as populated by pure, unmanifested potentialities that cannot be reduced to any actualities, and that the latter effort will generate some reason to conceive of the world as also including laws of nature that do not supervene upon nor are accountable in terms of anything actual. Furthermore, it is a hope that the success of both efforts might provide a sketch of a framework, or at least an assumption, on the basis of which a simpler approach to understanding counterfactuals may be forthcoming, namely a view that suggests how the mere potentialities to which the antecedents and consequents of counterfactuals are expected to refer do, indeed, exist in our world, and bear true and existing relations to one another.

In order to address how an actualist would account for the existence of an unmanifested potentiality of a dispositional property, let us begin by

things (and hence the same dispositional properties) must have the same laws (Ellis, 1994; 1999). It is important to add, however, that the distinction Ellis and others draw here does not clearly square with the Humean Supervenience Thesis as formulated by Lewis and Menzies at the outset of this paper. According to that formulation, two worlds with the same actual things, and thus the same regularities, presumably have the same laws.

⁷ In a recent article, Alexander Bird makes this actualist commitment clear by pointing out that the dispositional essentialist will be a necessitarian about laws, where he defines two such kinds of necessitarians, namely weak and strong. According to Bird, weak necessitarians believe that laws following from dispositions hold in all possible worlds where the relevant dispositions exist, though they might not exist in a particular possible world. In contrast, strong necessitarians believe that all laws hold in all possible worlds because the dispositional properties that entail those laws exist in all possible worlds (Bird, 2004, pp. 256-257). For more on the actualist spirit of dispositional essentialism, consider Ellis, 1999a, p. 70).

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Carlos A. Dufour

Inhärenz

Ontologische Untersuchungen zu Eigenschaften und Inhärenz

Wie reagiert man auf eine philosophische Frage? Wenn sie auf einer Verwirrung der Sprache und Logik beruht, kann man diese Frage durch geeignete Analysen auflösen. Andernfalls mag ein zusätzliches Wissen, etwa aus der Mathematik oder der Biologie, die richtige Antwort aufzeigen. Zuletzt gibt es ehrgeizige Fragen, denen nur durch philosophische Theoriebildung zu begegnen ist.

Ausgehend von dieser Trichotomie und in Auseinandersetzung mit der gängigen Sprachanalyse vertritt der Autor die These, daß die Philosophie letztlich theoretisch sein muß und ontologisch sein kann. Dazu ist es nötig, verbreitete Vorurteile abzubauen, was den ersten Teil des Buches ausmacht.

Den philosophischen Aufbau leitet eine Beschreibung der intentionalen Erlebnisse ein, in denen übergreifende ontologische Strukturen aufscheinen. Danach wird der Universalienrealismus gerechtfertigt, die Rolle der Eigenschaften dargelegt und eine minimale Mereologie eingeführt. Nach einer Analyse der Inhärenz argumentiert der Autor für ihre Realität und untersucht, welche Gesetze sie erfüllt. Akzidenzien sind der Grund, weshalb Dinge Eigenschaften kontingenterweise exemplifizieren können. Da Akzidenzien und ihre Subjekte Totalitäten bilden, entsteht ein Weltbild von Seinsschichten, in dem die Kontingenz in der Notwendigkeit aufgehoben wird.

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Truthmakers Without Truth¹

It is often taken for granted that truth is mind-independent, i.e. that, necessarily, if the world is objectively speaking in a certain way, then it is true that it is that way, independently of anyone thinking that it is that way. I argue that proponents of correspondence-truth, in particular immanent realists, should not take the mind-independence of truth for granted. The assumption that the mind-independent features of the world, i.e. ‘facts’, determine the truth of propositions, does not entail that truth is independent of minds. This follows only on the further assumption that there exist propositions about every feature of reality independent of minds, which is something the immanent realist can and should deny.

I

Among proponents of the correspondence theory, J.M.E. McTaggart being the outstanding exception (1927, sect. 15ff), it is almost universally assumed that the correspondence theory of truth is wedded to the idea that truth is mind-independent.² That is, it is believed that, necessarily, *if* the world is objectively speaking in a certain way, then it is true that it is that way, independently of anyone thinking or speaking about the way the world is. In this paper I will argue that the correspondence theory is not wedded to the idea that truth is mind-independent. Furthermore, that in particular those philosophers who restrict the scope of reality to the spatio-temporal world, i.e. immanent realists or naturalists, can and should reject

¹This paper was written with financial support from *STINT–The Swedish Foundation for International Cooperation in Research and Higher Education*, for which I am deeply grateful. Thanks also to all those anonymous referees and participants in research seminars at the University of Durham and Umeå University who have commented earlier versions of this paper and forced me to think, and think again. Special thanks to Jonathan Lowe and Ingvar Johansson for constructive critique and support.

² The content of this paper is greatly inspired by J.M.E. McTaggart’s reasoning in (1927, sect. 15 ff).

the mind-independence view. This discussion is wholly concerned with the correspondence theory of truth, and its implications.

The correspondence theory, in its broadest sense, is the view that truth is a relation to reality (Marian David, 1994: 17). More narrowly, the theory construes truth as a relational property of propositions, which they bear in virtue of a certain kind of relation to a determinate state of a portion of reality, i.e. a state of affairs, or fact. A *fact*, accordingly, is a portion of reality as that portion is in itself, independently of how we think it is. Since at least one of the relata of the correspondence relation is mind-independent, the correspondence relation is assumed to hold whether we know it to hold or not; in the words of Ingvar Johansson (2004), it is *cognition-independent*. To sum up, correspondence-truth requires a fact at one end of the correspondence relation, e.g., the sun as it is in itself, but also something at the other end of the relation. Something distinct from the sun itself, but which is about the sun, and which corresponds to it or is somehow made true by the sun, say, the proposition ‘the sun is a star’.³ Truth, according to the correspondence theory, is correspondence of proposition to fact, or, of truthbearer to truthmaker.⁴ In the words of J. L. Austin: “It takes two to make a truth” (1964: 23).

Proponents of correspondence-truth, and others, usually take it for granted that truth is independent of what we think or say. I will call this *the mind-independence intuition*. I call it an intuition because when used explicitly as an argument, typically, the reader is asked to accept as self-evident some suggestion about what would be true even if no one was thinking about it. For instance, that if it were a fact that the sun is a star, it would be true that the sun is a star even if there did not exist beings able to think or express ‘the sun is a star’. The following passage by Scott Soames is a typical example of the kind of reasoning I have in mind:

Certainly a proposition can be true even if it has never been expressed by any actual utterance. It is also not absurd to suppose that it can be true even if there is no sentence that expresses it. For example, for each of the non-numerably many real numbers, there is a proposition that it is greater than or equal to zero. If each sentence is a finite string of words drawn from a finite vocabulary, then the number of propositions outstrips the denumerable

³ I will henceforth use single quotation marks to refer to propositional content, as opposed to that which the content professes to be about.

⁴ Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, & Barry Smith initiated the use of ‘truthmakers’ and ‘truthbearers’ as general terms for that which determines the truth-value of something, and that which has the truth-value, respectively (1984: 287-321).

infinity of sentences available to express them - that is, there are truths with no linguistic expression. Moreover, if languages are man-made constructions, then propositions that are expressed by sentences could have been true even if no sentences had expressed them. For example the proposition that the sun is a star could have been true even if no one and hence no sentence had existed to express it (1999: 19).

According to Soames, there exist propositions that have no linguistic expression because there is a greater infinity of propositions than there are linguistic expressions. The passage also clearly illustrates that the mind-independence intuition of truth is closely linked to another idea also widely taken for granted by contemporary philosophers, notably that *propositions* exist independently of minds. Soames clearly assumes that propositions are mind-independent and therefore exist whether or not anyone thinks or expresses them. Indeed, he further strengthens his claim that there are *some* propositions that have no linguistic expression, by advancing the point that if there were no thinking beings, *no* proposition at all would have a linguistic expression, not even those that are presently expressed by sentences, and yet, he suggests they *could* be true. I interpret the contingency of the truth of the proposition 'the sun exists', implied by the term 'could', not as due to the contingent existence of propositions, but to the contingency of the existence of the sun; i.e. to the contingency of the truthmaker, not the truthbearer. If the sun did not exist, the proposition 'the sun exists' would still exist, but be false. However, if the existence of propositions were contingent, then Soames argument would fail since there would be no guarantee that for every real number there would be the proposition '*x* is greater than or equal to zero'. Soames' main point is surely to show that it is only a matter of contingent fact that propositions have linguistic expressions at all, while it is assumed to be a matter of objective necessity that there exist propositions about every feature of reality, whether actual or merely possible, and that are therefore true or false independently of minds.

It is still a matter of some controversy whether or not one should assume that propositions exist independently of minds (for an overview, see Rosen 2001), even though contemporary philosophers do not seem to be particularly worried about this controversy. In general, philosophers take it for granted that it would be of no significant importance to assume, for the sake of convenience, that there exist propositions about everything, independently of minds. There is even a name for the assumption that for all being, there is a proposition (not necessarily thought by anyone) that truly renders the nature of this being. Stephen Read calls it *expressibility* (2000). Of course, *if* truth is correspondence between proposition and fact, and *if*

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Petrus Hispanus *Logische Abhandlungen* *Tractatus / Summulae Logicales*

**Erste Übersetzung ins Deutsche aus dem Lateinischen
Von Wolfgang Degen und Bernhard Pabst**

Petrus Hispanus Portugalensis (ca. 1210-1277) hat dieses Kompendium der Logik verfasst. Es zeichnet sich besonders dadurch aus, dass es eine Zusammenfassung der antiken Logik (Logica antiqua und der bedeutenden mittelalterlichen Neuerungen (Logica moderna/modernorum) bietet. Die wichtigste antike Quelle stellt das Organon des Aristoteles dar, aus dem einerseits die Kernstücke der formalen Logik entnommen wurden, wie assertorische, modale und hypothetische Sätze samt der assertorischen und modalen Syllogistik, sowie die Anwendung für Lösungsversuche von Trugschlüssen, andererseits auch syntaktische und semantische Analysen von Sätzen, Satzarten und Satzteilen, sowie der Wahrheit von Aussagen. Außerdem finden sich Ansätze zu einer Philosophie der Logik und ontologische Betrachtungen über Prädikamente und Universalien.

Das Spezifikum der Logica moderna ist die Lehre von den proprietates terminorum, d.h. die von den referentiellen Eigenschaften oder Funktionen der Termini, wie suppositio naturalis, simplex und personalis, ampliatio, copulatio und appellatio. In dieser Lehre fließen Sprach-, Begriffs- und Gegenstandsanalysen zusammen, entsprechend einer dreistelligen Semantik, die durch vox-intellectus-res gekennzeichnet ist.

Die Summulae Logicales waren für über zwei Jahrhunderte das Standardwerk der Logik und erlebten noch in der Zeit des Buchdrucks seine große Anzahl von unveränderten Auflagen.

Der Übersetzung liegt die kritische Ausgabe von Lambert M. de Rijk aus dem Jahre 1972 zugrunde.

Kollegen, Studenten und jedem anderen Interessierten wird hier ein Text zur Verfügung gestellt, der nicht nur der Forschung und Lehre, sondern auch der Begriffsklärung und dem eigenen Denken einen wichtigen Dienst erweisen kann.

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PETER FORREST

Endurance and Fatalism

ABSTRACT

If persons persist from one time to another they do so, I claim, by perduring, that is by having temporal parts. First I argue that if persons endure, that is persist without having temporal parts, then they have time-dependent properties. Next, I argue that if enduring persons change by having time-dependent properties, then fatalism, or, more accurately, ontological determinism, holds. Hence those of us who consider that ontological determinism is incompatible with our own experience of responsibility have reason to reject the thesis that persons endure. This is significant because endurance might otherwise be thought to cohere better with belief in responsibility than perdurance.

*Endurance and Fatalism**

If persons persist from one time to another they do so, I claim, by perduring, that is by having temporal parts. My case depends on the admittedly controversial assumption that truths are grounded in reality. First I argue that if persons endure, that is persist without having temporal parts, then they have time-dependent properties. Next, I argue that if enduring persons change by having time-dependent properties, then fatalism, or, more accurately, ontological determinism, holds. Hence those of us who consider that ontological determinism is incompatible with our own experience of responsibility have reason to reject the thesis that persons endure. This is significant because endurance might otherwise be thought to cohere better with belief in responsibility than perdurance.

* I am grateful to the organisers and participants of: David Charles' seminar at Oriel College, Oxford, on May 5 2004; the Philosophy Seminar at the University of Western Australia on May 26 2004; and the Origins of Temporal Experience Conference, hosted by the Centre for Time at Sydney University, July 16 to 17, 2004. I read versions of this paper on all three occasions. I would also like to acknowledge the support of an Australian Research Council Discovery Grant.

1. Lewis' Problem of Temporary Intrinsic.

Because I am concerned with persons and fatalism the example I shall consider is one WT (a “weighty thinker”, Aquinas or Hume maybe). WT will for convenience be taken to be born in the year 0. In year 10 WT has mass less than 100 kilos but in year 30 has mass over 100 kilos. The case I shall be discussing was whether WT was fated to weigh over 100 kilos, but first consider David Lewis’ problem of temporary intrinsic. Adapting his discussion to the example of WT, we may ask how it is possible for the same thing, WT, to have the incompatible properties, *having mass less than 100 kilos* and *having mass over 100 kilos* (Lewis 1986: 203-4).

Lewis’ preferred answer – and mine – is that WT is the sum of temporal parts at least one of which has mass less than, and at least one of which has mass over, 100 kilos. In that case WT is said to *perdure*. Most perdurantists hold that it is sufficient that these stages be suitably related for the sum to be a person, but in addition we might perhaps require them all to share a special property a *thisness*, which, excepting time travel examples, no two non-overlapping person stages could share at the same time. I mention this only to make it clear that the resulting position is not my target. Lewis also considers the possibility that things *endure*, that is persist from one time to another without having any temporal parts, but have time-relative properties. This position is my target and in the case of WT it involves saying that WT has the compatible properties *having mass less than 100 kilos in Year 10* and *having mass over 100 kilos in Year 30*. Lewis objects to this that it paraphrases a change in intrinsic properties as the having of distinct time-dependent and hence extrinsic properties. My purpose is to provide a different, and I think more powerful, objection, which is part of a case against endurance.

First, though, I need to argue that an enduring thing— whether a person or anything else that undergoes change – must have time-dependent properties.¹ The alternative for endurantists would seem to be a theory of time-

¹ Michael Tooley (1997: 236-38) has pressed the need for truth-makers for truths about the past as an argument against Presentism. If we could countenance time-dependent properties then enduring states of affairs, such as that WT is less than 100 kilos in Year 10, provide suitable truth-makers. Tooley would, however, object that

dependent instantiation, according to which the property *having mass over 100 kilos* is not instantiated in year 10 by WT but is instantiated in year 30 by WT. My case against this alternative is based upon the thesis that every truth has *grounds*. The most straightforward reading of the phrase “grounds for the truth of” is “truth-maker” (Mulligan et al. 1984, Fox 1986, Armstrong 1997) But I am using the more neutral term “grounds” to accommodate John Bigelow’s thesis that truth supervenes on being, in which case we would include in the grounds the lack of some other grounds. (Bigelow 1988: 132). It could even be extended to include events as grounds. The important characteristics of the grounds for truth are that they are non-linguistic and that they are dateable. The precise analytic ontology involved is not relevant.

The standard theory of truth-making is that the existence of the truth-maker, or more generally the occurrence of the grounds for truth, *necessitates* the truth in question. Some readers might prefer an alternative theory in which the necessitation is weakened so that the truth-maker or other grounds merely establishes a presumption of truth. In that case we might say that “Jane smoked her last cigarette in 1978” has for its presumptive grounds her act of smoking in 1978 together with the negative state of affairs that she has not smoked since. It would only be presumptive because she might take up smoking again. I have, however, chosen an example in which this complication is not relevant.

Assuming, then, that truths have grounds, I now argue using the premise that in year 30, the truth “WT in year 10 weighed less than 100 kilos” has the same grounds as it had in year 30. But if WT endures the only way that the truth-maker for “WT in year 10 weighed less than 100 kilos” could be unchanging would be if there were time-dependent properties. The premise may in turn be argued for in two ways. First, unless the grounds remain the same it is not clear why truths such as “WT in year 10 weighed less than 100 kilos” could not subsequently be made false, perhaps by divine fiat. But we know they cannot. The second is that if our capacity to update beliefs with the passage of time required reality to undergo a retrospective change this would surely strike us as problematic, and yet we confidently update our beliefs. Hence we should grant that the updating of beliefs is

truth-makers cannot endure unless their constituents endure. For a recent discussion of the argument from truth-makers against Presentism, see (Keller 2004)

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Untersuchungen zur Ontologie

Der Sammelband umfasst historische Aufsätze von I. Angelelli und R. Cahn. Die Beiträge von W. Degen und K. Mulligan nehmen Themen der Verbindung von Semantik, Logik und Ontologie auf.

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Wahrheit und Propositionen

Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes besteht darin, für die folgenden drei Thesen zu argumentieren: (T1) Wahrheit ist eine Eigenschaft; (T2) Propositionen sind die primären Träger der Eigenschaft der Wahrheit und alle sekundären Wahrheitsträger stehen in sowohl deskriptiven als auch normativen Abhängigkeitsbeziehungen zu Propositionen; (T3) Propositionen sind strukturierte abstrakte Entitäten mit ausschließlich abstrakten Konstituenten. Im ersten Abschnitt dieses Aufsatzes werde ich vier Argumente für die These (T1) vorbringen. Im zweiten Abschnitt werde ich eine schrittweise Rechtfertigung von (T2) geben. D.h. ich werde erstens für die These argumentieren, daß Propositionen als Entitäten anzuerkennen sind; zweitens, daß Propositionen Träger der Eigenschaft der Wahrheit sind; und drittens, daß nur Propositionen als primäre Träger der Wahrheit in Frage kommen, wenn man dem Umstand gerecht werden will, daß es mehrere unterschiedliche Arten von Wahrheitsträgern gibt. Daran anschließend werde ich die Verhältnisse zwischen Propositionen und sekundären Wahrheitsträgern beleuchten. Im dritten und letzten Abschnitt dieses Aufsatzes werde ich mich mit der Frage nach der ontologischen Natur von Propositionen befassen. Die gängigsten Auffassungen bezüglich der Natur von Propositionen werden eingeführt und es wird in diesem Zusammenhang für die These (T3) argumentiert.

(1) Wahrheit ist eine Eigenschaft

Es gibt unterschiedliche Kriterien, deren Erfüllung die Anerkennung einer Eigenschaft der Wahrheit erfordern kann. Ich möchte von vier unterschiedlichen Kriterien bei meiner Argumentation für die Anerkennung der Existenz der Eigenschaft der Wahrheit und der Tatsache, daß der Ausdruck ‚ist wahr‘ ein Ausdruck für diese Eigenschaft ist, Gebrauch machen.

Das erste dieser vier Kriterien ist ein logisch-semantisches Kriterium. Wenn es Gründe dafür gibt, den Ausdruck ‚ist wahr‘ als ein genuines logisches Prädikat aufzufassen, dann ist dieser Umstand ein Kriterium dafür, daß der Ausdruck ‚ist wahr‘ für die Eigenschaft der Wahrheit steht, und daß somit diese Eigenschaft anzuerkennen ist. Ein genuines logisches Prä-

dikat zeichnet sich dadurch aus, daß ihm eine Extension, also eine Menge von Gegenständen zugeordnet werden kann, die jene Gegenstände umfaßt, auf die in einem minimalistischen Sinn der betreffende Ausdruck zutrifft oder die in einem maximalistischen Sinn die Eigenschaft exemplifizieren, für die der betreffende Ausdruck steht.

Das zweite der vier anzuführenden Kriterien ist ein semantisch-pragmatisches Kriterium. Wenn gezeigt werden kann, daß keine sinnvolle Alternative zu der Auffassung gefunden werden kann, daß Sätze der Form ‚a ist wahr‘ als einfache Prädikationen der Eigenschaft der Wahrheit anzusehen sind und somit dazu verwendet werden können, um einem Gegenstand a die Eigenschaft der Wahrheit zuzuschreiben, dann ist dieser Umstand ein eindeutiger Beleg für die Anerkennung der Existenz der Eigenschaft der Wahrheit.

Das dritte der vier anzuführenden Kriterien ist ein semantisches Kriterium. Wenn es Gründe dafür gibt, daß der Ausdruck ‚Wahrheit‘ oder ‚Wahr zu sein‘ in manchen Verwendungskontexten als abstrakter, singulärer Term fungiert, der die Eigenschaft der Wahrheit bezeichnet, dann liefert dieser Umstand ein eindeutiges Kriterium für die Anerkennung der Eigenschaft der Wahrheit.

Das vierte und letzte Kriterium ist ein ontologisch-explanatorisches Kriterium. Wenn es Gründe dafür gibt, daß das Bestehen bestimmter Moore-scher Tatsachen, d. h. unzweifelhaft bestehender Tatsachen, nur durch die Anerkennung der Existenz der Eigenschaft der Wahrheit erklärt werden kann, dann ist dieser Umstand ein weiteres eindeutiges Kriterium für die Anerkennung der Eigenschaft der Wahrheit.

Welche Belege lassen sich in bezug auf die Erfüllung dieser vier Kriterien anführen? Als erstes möchte ich eine ontologische Argumentation als Beleg für die Erfüllung des vierten Kriteriums anführen. Es besteht ein ontologisch signifikanter Unterschied zwischen der Behauptung, daß Schnee weiß ist, wenn Schnee weiß ist und derselben Behauptung, wenn Schnee nicht weiß ist. Dieser Unterschied kann aber weder (allein) an den intrinsischen Eigenschaften dieser Behauptung noch am Weiß-sein von Schnee festgemacht werden. Denn derselbe ontologisch signifikante Unterschied besteht zwischen der Behauptung, daß Schnee nicht weiß ist, wenn Schnee nicht weiß ist und derselben Behauptung, wenn Schnee weiß ist. Ebenso wie sich das Weiß-sein von Schnee grundlegend von der Tatsache unterscheidet, daß Schnee nicht weiß ist, so unterscheidet sich die Behauptung, daß Schnee weiß ist, grundlegend von der Behauptung, daß Schnee nicht weiß ist. Das eine ist in beiden Fällen das Gegenteil des anderen. Dennoch

scheint dieselbe Entsprechung zwischen der Behauptung, daß Schnee weiß ist, wenn Schnee weiß ist, und der Behauptung, daß Schnee nicht weiß ist, wenn Schnee nicht weiß ist, zu bestehen. Diese Entsprechung zwischen dem ersten und dem dritten der angeführten möglichen Sachverhalte und der jeweilige ontologisch signifikante Unterschied einerseits zwischen dem ersten und dem zweiten dieser Sachverhalte und andererseits zwischen dem dritten und vierten, kann nur durch das Bestehen einer Relation oder das Zutreffen einer relationalen Eigenschaft auf die besagten Behauptungen erklärt werden. Diese relationale Eigenschaft trifft auf die Behauptung, daß Schnee weiß ist, genau dann zu, wenn Schnee weiß ist, so wie sie auf die Behauptung, daß Schnee nicht weiß ist, genau dann zutrifft, wenn Schnee nicht weiß ist. Hinter dieser relationalen Eigenschaft verbirgt sich meiner Ansicht nichts anderes als die Eigenschaft, die wir gewöhnlich *die Eigenschaft der Wahrheit* nennen. D. h. eine Erklärung der Entsprechung zwischen zwei der angeführten vier Sachverhalte und eine Erklärung der angeführten ontologischen Unterschiede bedarf der Anerkennung der Eigenschaft der Wahrheit. In diesem Sinn scheint das vierte angeführte Kriterium durch die vorgebrachte Argumentation erfüllt zu sein.

Ein weiteres Argument als Beleg für die Erfüllung dieses vierten Kriteriums läßt sich wie folgt formulieren: Die Eigenschaft der (semantischen) Folgerichtigkeit von Argumenten ist nicht nur der zentrale Gegenstand der Logik, sondern das Zutreffen dieser Eigenschaft erfordert die Existenz der Eigenschaft der Wahrheit. Denn nur solche Argumente können als folgerichtig bezeichnet werden, in bezug auf die gilt, daß es logisch notwendig ist, daß wenn die Prämissen eines solchen Arguments wahr sind, auch die Konklusion wahr ist. Wenn der Ausdruck ‚ist wahr‘ in diesem Zusammenhang nicht für die Eigenschaft der Wahrheit stehen würde, dann würde damit die Eigenschaft der Folgerichtigkeit von Argumenten ebenso ihre Sinnhaftigkeit und ihre Existenzberechtigung verlieren. Es scheint allerdings eine Mooresche Tatsache zu sein, daß es folgerichtige und nicht-folgerichtige Argumente gibt. Weshalb die Existenz der Eigenschaft der Folgerichtigkeit nicht sinnvoll bezweifelt werden kann. Wenn die Existenz dieser Eigenschaft jedoch die Existenz der Eigenschaft der Wahrheit voraussetzt, dann ist dies auch ein eindeutiger Beleg für die Existenz der Eigenschaft der Wahrheit.

GIULIANO TORRENTO

Tenseless Cross-Temporal Relations

ABSTRACT

One of the oldest challenge to presentism—the thesis that everything that exists is present—is the claim that present entities may bear relations to past ones. Consider, for instance, the *prima facie* true statement ‘Clinton belongs to the same political party as JFK’. Some presentists reject the idea that every relation entails the existence of its relata (thereby endorsing a ‘non-serious’ version of presentism), but this seems to involve an ontologically suspicious commitment to Meinongian non-existent entities. An alternative option is to reject cross-temporality altogether: what looks like cross-temporal instantiation is just simultaneous instantiation of some sort. However, rejecting instantiation by non-existing entities is not always a good reason to do away with cross-temporality—consider claims such as ‘my son was shorter at two than my daughter was at two’, which is about two presently existing entities. In a recent article, Berit Brogaard proposes to construe cross-temporal instantiation in terms of irreducibly tensed relations—a position that presentists may be willing to accept. In what follows, I argue that Brogaard’s solution is both likely to be unsatisfying for a ‘serious’ presentist, and it has to face two major problems. Those problems can be solved only if we understand cross-temporality in terms of instantiation of tenseless ordinary relations by temporal parts of ordinary objects. This means that either presentism has to prove compatible with tenseless cross-temporal relations, or it has to be rejected.

I. Presentism and the argument from relations

In the recent literature on the metaphysics of time, there is a wide-spread revival of presentism, i.e. the thesis that, for every entity x

(P) x exists iff x exists at the present time

As a consequence, presentists have endeavored to defend their tenets against old and new objections¹. One of the oldest puzzles that presentism

¹ See SMITH, 1993, HINCHLIFF, 1996, BIGELOW, 1996, MERRICKS, 1999, MARKOSIAN, 2004, CRISP 2005. See also PRIOR, 1970 and CHISHOLM, 1990.

has to face is the so-called argument from relations. Here is how John Bigelow² has it:

Take as a first supposition that, in order for a relation to hold between two things, both those two things will have to exist. Call this the principle that all relations are existence entailing. Add as a further premise the supposition that relations sometimes hold between a present thing and something else which is not present. The conclusion follows ineluctably, that some things exist which are not present.

The argument rests on two assumptions, firstly the principle that all relations are existence entailing (a.k.a. the Principle of Relations)³

(PR) If x, y, z, \dots stand in relation R , then $x, y, z \dots$ exist

and secondly the principle of cross-temporal instantiation, i.e.

(CI) Given a relation R , it is possible that its relata x, y, z, \dots enter R at different times

Consider, for instance:

(1) John admires Ramsey

(2) Clinton belongs to the same political party as JFK.

Certain presentists, such as Hinchliff and Adams, have suggested to abandon (PR), by endorsing a *unrestricted* version of presentism, according to which non-existing entities may nonetheless enter into relations with other entities (and exemplify properties). However, few

² See BIGELOW, 1996: 37. See also CRISP, 2005.

³ Intentional relations constitute a clear counter-example to (PR), take for instance: ‘Othello loves Desdemona’, or ‘Orson Wells loves Don Quixote’. However, as also Bigelow notice, the argument from relations may rest on a weaker (and far less controversial) assumption than (PR), i.e. the assumption (PR') that at least certain relations are existence symmetric—namely if one of the terms exists, so do the others. For the argument to go through is enough that at least certain existence symmetric relations are instantiated by entities that exist at different times. Causal relations, for example, yield an instance of the latter.

presentists have turned out to be willing to accept in their ontologies non-existing objects⁴.

An ontologically more parsimonious option is to reject (CI), and to reduce all cases of apparent cross-temporal instantiation to simultaneous instantiation. Consequently, sentence such as (1) and (2) must be, strictly speaking at least, false. Ted Sider and Ned Markosian⁵ have proposed to treat (1) and (2) as quasi-truths—i.e. truths philosophical niceties aside—whose underlying truths—i.e. the truth on which (1) and (2) would supervene, were presentism false—are sentences concerning the properties of the world at different times. Thomas Crisp⁶ has argued that (1) – (2) do not provide very strong evidence for the existence of their non-present relata. Notice, however, that accounting for bearing the relation R to a past, and therefore non-existing object does not imply accounting for the cross-temporal instantiation of R. By rejecting (PR), the presentist is granting that a past entity *x* may stand in a relation R with a present entity *y*, and therefore, *one way or another*, *x* and *y* instantiate R each at a different time⁷. By rejecting (CI), the presentist does not need to say anything more on the matter of cross-temporality. However, consider (3), an example by Berit Brogaard

(3) My son was shorter at age two than my daughter was at age two

On the one hand, (3) seems to ascribe to my son and my daughter a cross-temporally instantiated relation, and therefore the presentist should deny that (3) is true. On the other, my son and my daughter are both presently existing entities, and therefore one cannot maintain that (3) is false *because* non-existing entities cannot exemplify properties or enter into relations. A

⁴ See ADAMS, 1986. Moreover, BERGMANN, 1996 and 1999 argues that presentism entails serious presentism—i.e. the conjunction of (P) and (PR). But see also the counter-arguments in HUDSON, 1997.

⁵ See SIDER, 1999 and MARKOSIAN, 2004.

⁶ See CRISP, 2005. Crisp, however, do not think that for a singular proposition about objects *x*, *y*, *z*... to be true *x*, *y*, *z*... need to exist, therefore he also rejects (PR). Other philosophers that reject (CI) are BIGELOW, 1996 and CHISHOLM, 1990, who revises the logical form of sentences ascribing cross-time relations.

⁷ Indeed no theory of cross-temporal instantiation is presented by Hinchliff or Adams, let apart for the hint at the fact that cross-temporal instantiation is to be intended as an expansion of their favorite theory of instantiation at a time of properties and simultaneous relations.

Artefakte

1. Einleitung

Wenn in ontologischen Ausführungen von der Kategorie der Dinge die Rede ist, rücken normalerweise Lebewesen, menschliche v.a., in den Brennpunkt des Interesses. Und das hat natürlich seine historische und auch sachliche Berechtigung. Von den nicht-lebendigen oder nicht-natürlichen Dingen wie Autos, Computer, Tischen, Stühlen, etc. ist dann oft nur am Rande die Rede: Die gebe es (wenn überhaupt) irgendwie auch noch. Aber was genau sie seien, könne man nicht sagen, sei auch nicht so wichtig, meinen manche ... - Ich möchte mich einer derartigen Meinung entgegensetzen und einmal die *Artefakte*, wie ich im folgenden nicht-lebendige oder nicht-natürliche Dinge nennen werde, zum Thema einer ontologischen Abhandlung machen. Dabei greife ich z.T. Thesen auf, die bereits in der Fachliteratur zu finden sind, andere wiederum bringe ich neu ein; allesamt formuliere ich diese etwas näher aus, versuche sie in einen systematischen Zusammenhang zu bringen und ein Stück weit zu verteidigen.

Bevor ich das tue, schicke ich eine Reihe von Überlegungen voraus. Zunächst einmal eine Einschränkung. Der Bereich der Artefakte ist überaus diffus und schwierig zu überschauen. M.E. sind nämlich nicht nur Werkzeuge und Gebrauchsgegenstände zu den Artefakten zu zählen, sondern auch manche Kunstwerke, Museumsexponate, aber auch institutionelle Artefakte wie Bankkonten, um nur einige wenige zu nennen. Ich werde mich hier bei der Erarbeitung eines allgemeinen ontologischen Rahmens an den Werkzeugen und Gebrauchsgegenständen orientieren. Ich kann hier nicht ausfallen, inwiefern sich eine solche allgemeine Ontologie der Artefakte auch auf die anderen genannten und ungenannten Gegenstände anwenden lässt.

Dann ein Wort zu meinem Motiv. Natürlich geht es mir, wenn ich schon über Artefakte schreibe, über die Artefakte als solche. Aber nicht nur. Ich glaube nämlich, dass man, ausgehend von Artefakten, den Blick schärfen kann auch für nicht-artifizielle Dinge und somit für einen weite-

ren, differenzierenden ontologischen Rahmen der Dinge insgesamt. Mitunter wird dieses Motiv spürbar werden.

Und dann zum Schluss der Einleitung auch gleich die Überleitung zum nächsten. Was ich hier zu machen versuche, setzt viel voraus. Alles aufzurollen ist im Rahmen eines Artikels nicht sinnvoll. Ich möchte ja zu meinen Punkten kommen, und mich nicht im Grundsätzlichen aufhalten. Dennoch will ich zumindest andeuten, was ich alles voraussetze, um daran auch positiv anknüpfen zu können. Der Darlegung meiner Prämissen soll der nächste Abschnitt gewidmet sein.

2. Voraussetzungen

Bei meinen Voraussetzungen kann ich wiederum unterscheiden zwischen allgemeinen und besonderen. Die allgemeinste Voraussetzung, die ich hier mache, ist, dass es sinnvoll ist, Ontologie *deskriptiv* zu betreiben, sprich als philosophische Analyse der Grundstrukturen unserer alltäglichen Lebenswelt als solcher. „Deskriptiv“ steht im Gegensatz zu „revisionär“, worunter ich jene Ansätze verstehe, die Ontologie als allgemeinen begrifflichen Rahmen der (im Normalfall physikalischen) Basis unserer Lebenswelt auffassen. Einen Grundbereich unserer alltäglichen Lebenswelt machen nun *Partikularien* aus, worunter ich konkrete (im Gegensatz zu abstrakten) Individuen (im Gegensatz zu den Universalien) verstehe, von denen gilt, dass sie nicht von etwas anderem ausgesagt werden können¹. Im Bereich der Partikularien kommen nun Ereignisse und Zustände vor, die ich hier allerdings beiseite lasse, und, als eigene Kategorie, die *Dinge*, worunter im Allgemeinen *materielle Gegenstände* verstanden werden. Dinge sind, im Unterschied zu Ereignissen und Zuständen, drei- und nicht vierdimensionale Entitäten. Sie haben also eine räumliche, nicht aber eine zeitliche Ausdehnung, was zur Folge hat, dass sie zu jedem Zeitpunkt ihrer Geschichte nicht nur teilweise, sondern als Ganze da sind. Darin begründet sich ein weiteres grundlegendes ontologisches Merkmal, nämlich ihre diachrone Identität im strikten Sinn.

Meine besonderen Voraussetzungen betreffen die Konstitution von Dingen. Soweit ich diese in meiner Abhandlung über Artefakte benötige, möchte ich sie im Folgenden kurz darlegen.

¹ Vgl. Kanzian 2001, 153ff.

2.1 Die innere Sachverhaltsstruktur der Dinge

Beginnen wir dabei mit der Feststellung, dass Dinge (als materielle Gegenstände) aus einem *Material* bestehen.² Was aber Dinge weiterhin ausmacht ist, dass ihr Material in irgendeiner Weise geformt ist. Unter *Form* verstehe ich zunächst keinen technischen Terminus, etwa der klassischen Metaphysik, sondern einfach die *Weise wie* die materialen Bestandteile eines Dinges zusammengesetzt sind. Ohne eine konkrete Form können wir von keinem Ding sprechen. Es muss eine Form vorliegen, die bestimmt, wie die jeweiligen materialen Bausteine zueinander stehen bzw. wirken bzw. sich entwickeln. - Inwiefern ergibt sich aus diesen Überlegungen aber eine *sachverhaltsartige* Struktur von Dingen? Unter Entitäten mit sachverhaltsartiger Struktur verstehe ich, allgemein gesprochen, solche, die man als *komplexe* Gebilde auffassen kann, in denen *verschiedenartige* Elemente zusammen vorkommen. Was auch immer das *Material, aus dem* Dinge bestehen, sowie die *Form wie* Dinge bestehen, sind, sie sind doch, um zunächst das eine Moment sachverhaltsartiger Struktur zur Geltung zu bringen, *verschieden*. Dinge bestehen somit aus zwei verschiedenen Komponenten. Sie sind komplexe Entitäten. Sind aber die Komponenten auch *verschiedenartig*, wie das oben als zweites Moment für sachverhaltsartige Strukturen verlangt wurde? Ich meine, das ist der Fall. M.E. ergibt sich diese Verschiedenartigkeit daraus, dass das eine Element, *Material aus dem ...*, niemals die Funktion des anderen, *Form wie ...* für den Aufbau des Komplexes, des ganzen Dinges, wird erfüllen können. Somit ergibt sich, dass Dinge eine irreduzible innere Komplexität aus verschiedenartigen Elementen aufweisen. Sie sind, in eingeführtem Sinne verstanden, sachverhaltsartig strukturiert.

² „Material“ verwende ich als *Funktion* eines metaphysischen Bestandteils von Dingen, und zwar im Hinblick auf die Konstitution des Dinges. Der Gegensatz von „material“ ist: „die Form betreffend“. „Materiell“ steht für „körperlich“, im Gegensatz zu unkörperlich oder geistig. Ich meine, dass alle Dinge ein „materielles Material“ besitzen. Das schließt aber nicht aus, dass es bei den Dingen „rein *materielle*“ und „nicht rein *materielle*“ gibt. Auch folgt daraus nicht, dass es keine Entitäten geben könne mit nicht-materiellem Material. Aus dem Gesagten folgt nur, dass Entitäten mit nicht-materiellem Material keine Dinge sein können, sondern eben nicht-dinghafte Individuen.

FRED WILSON

Science and Religion: No Irenics Here

ABSTRACT

There is a view, once again gaining favour, that science and religion are just different things and that they are compatible. But things are not, I propose, that simple. (Many) religions hold that values are objectively there, as part of the ontological structure of the universe. This position found philosophical expression in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle (and their many successors through the ages). It holds that in order to understand things of this world it is necessary to transcend it to see how things "down here" fit into that objective value structure. Scientific understanding, in contrast, is wholly naturalistic, of this world "down here." It does yield casual understanding of things, and a method for resolving differences, in a way that religious/metaphysical positions never offered such a method. It thereby shows that that religious/metaphysical way of thinking is in fact fantasy. But further: it shows that to understand things one does not have to find some sort of objective value structure in which to place them. As for the values that we have, it shows that these are rooted in our psychology and our culture: so their only justification is not some fantastic absolute or objective standard, but only in how they serve human well-being. There are two consequences of the emergence of scientific ways of thinking: the first is that it frees us from the illusion of objective values, enabling us to look (paradoxically) objectively at our moral values and to evaluate them according to human standards; and the second is that it forces us to take responsibility for the values we act upon -- no longer can we escape that responsibility by ascribing them to God or to an objective value structure in the universe ("natural law").

Stephen Jay Gould has argued¹ that there is science on the one hand and morality and religion on the other, and that these are non-overlapping magisteria (NOMA): there is no logical conflict between them, they do different things: the one deals with matters of fact, the other deals with

1. Stephen Jay Gould, *Rock of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life* (New York: Ballantine Publishing Group, 1999). See also Michael Ruse, *Can a Darwinian be a Christian?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

matters of value, of goodness and God.²

This sounds much like the fact-value distinction that is part and parcel of the scientific world view. But things are not so simple. There are other world views. And in any case, morality is one thing, God and ultimate reality and meaning is another.

Many religions – certainly the religions of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic traditions – hold that values are objectively there, as part of the ontological structure of the universe. On this view, our value judgments are either true or false depending upon what are the objective values in the universe. “That must be bad because God has laid it down that way.” So, no gay rights, no masturbation. “It’s not up to me to decide, it is God’s will, so I have to excise these people who go contrary to the natural order of things laid down by God.” “The ultimate meaning of your life is determined by the will of God.” Thus formulated, these are merely beliefs, or at best beliefs. To be more than that, they need a defence, some sort of philosophical defence. These doctrines found that philosophical defence in the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle.

It begins with Socrates, dissatisfied with the explanations proposed by Anaxagoras for explaining ordinary events in the world. Socrates argued with Anaxagoras, so Plato records in the *Phaedo*.³ The latter, Socrates declared, could not explain why he, Socrates, was about to drink the hemlock rather than escape to Thebes. The event – the observable event – of sitting in his cell is to be followed by another event; these events, which are given to us in our sensible experience of the world, are separable – the earlier does not, in itself, imply a later. Yet, why this event rather than that event follows the earlier needs an explanation, at least it does if we are to count things as rational, as having reasons. Anaxagoras argued that, in effect, people, like other animals, are skin and bones. But this does not explain: at best it leaves us acting like other animals, out of material self interest: if Anaxagoras were right then he, Socrates, would flee prison for Thebes. Yet Socrates is about to do what the dog would not do, namely stay and drink the hemlock. He is doing this because (a) it is “for the best” – he is doing what he dutifully owes to Athens – , and (b) he is acting to bring about the best, so far as he can attain it. There is on the one hand the form of perfect human justice – the *a priori* form of human justice – *a*

2. Gould, p. 5.

3. See *Phaedo* [trans. G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett, 1977)], 97c1ff.

priori, because we have never experienced ideal morality in the ordinary world, only imitations that fall short of it, only mere approximations to it –, and there is, on the other hand, the striving which is Socrates: Socrates, as an active being, so moves his body as to imitate in the world of ordinary experience the ideal form of human justice. It is this striving to imitate the form that explains why Socrates sitting in prison is to be followed by his drinking the hemlock rather than by his running off to Thebes.⁴

Here are eight important points about this metaphysics.

First, the explanation model proceeds in terms of unifying the events of ordinary experience. These events are separable, that is, logically separable. They come to be connected through the activity of an entity, something that Socrates refers to as his soul. The unification is thus a unification by an *entity*. Understanding ordinary events thus comes through our capacity to grasp the activity of this entity that unifies. Socrates being in prison will be followed by his drinking the hemlock and not by his running off to Thebes, because he as his soul strives in a way that connects the two events.

Second, the activity has a certain form. This form is objectively there in the world. So is the soul. Both, however, are outside the world of ordinary experience; they transcend that world. So both are timeless, and in that sense immortal. Socrates makes clear that the immortality of the soul was the main conclusion that he wished to draw from his alternative explanation scheme.

Third, the soul actively aims to imitate in its outward appearance an ideal form. The form thus enters as a crucial piece in the explanation. The form is the *reason* why things are as they are.

4. For discussion of this argument against Anaxagoras, see R. Turnbull, "Aristotle's Debt to the 'Natural Philosophy' of the *Phaedo*," *Philosophical Quarterly*, 8 (1963), pp. 131-143; and G. Vlastos, "Reason and Causes in the *Phaedo*," *Philosophical Review*, 78 (1969), pp. 291-325

See also F. Wilson, *Socrates, Lucretius, Camus: Two Philosophical Traditions on Death*, (Lewiston, NY: Mellen, 2002), pp. 97ff; and F. Wilson, "Socrates' Argument for Immortality: Socrates, Maritain, Grant and the Ontology of Morals," *Maritain Studies*, 20 (2004), pp. 3-26.

DISCUSSION

WOLFGANG DEGEN

Metaphysics Without Task

1. Introduction

Kant: (1) *Die erste und notwendigste Frage ist wohl: was die Vernunft eigentlich mit der Metaphysik will?*

Kant: (2) *..., wo [d.h. in der Metaphysik] jedermann, der sonst in allen Dingen unwissend ist, sich ein entscheidendes Urteil anmaasst, weil in diesem Lande in der Tat noch kein sicheres Maass und Gewicht vorhanden ist, um Gründlichkeit von seichem Geschwätz zu unterscheiden.*

Paracelsus: (3) *... denn des Menschen Geist wehrt sich mehr als der des Viehs* (e.g. against the noise produced by pious ontometaphysical blockheads)

Anonymus: (4) *Homo est animal refutans*

Kant: (5) *..., welches eben so viel sagt, als, es gebe überall keine Metaphysik und könne auch keine geben.*¹

During the 20th century, Metaphysics and Ontology seem to have experienced a rebirth, after having been declared dead during the 19th century, because not even Kant was able to save or revive any parts of metaphysics after Hume's decisive blow. Even in the first years of the 20th century metaphysics and ontology, both freshly resurrected, lived a not too honorable life. By now, however, these two former cinderellas have grown old, fat and respectable. Nevertheless, nobody could say before 1999 what they are doing, nobody could say before 1999 what they really are (in their innermost essence). Under these circumstances, it is a big merit that a book undertook the explicit task to define metaphysics (and perhaps ontology too?), and above all, to define the task of metaphysics. This book is Gracia's *Metaphysics and its Task* [1] which appeared exactly in 1999. On the

¹The reader is invited to look up Kant's definitions of Ontology and Metaphysics, and to explain why he does not like them, and in which respects they contradict Gracia's definition.

other hand, it is not quite certain that Gracia's definitions are shared by all metaphysicians — although they are surely shared by the overwhelming majority of metaphysicians, and (what is more) by some metaphysical giants. Therefore, I am very grateful to the journal **Metaphysica** (aka The International Journal of Ontology and Metaphysics)² to publish the present discussion paper; for it will help to provoke some reflections about the proper definition of Metaphysics (and Ontology) — and perhaps their tasks.

The present paper is mainly a *discussion paper*; but it includes also a sort of review of [1]. I should even say that my reflections (presented in the present paper) took their start with [1]; and here I want to document this start and its development for the metaphysician interested in Metaphysics.

2. *The Review Itself*

After Metaphysics (or Philosophy) seems to have ceased to be an *Ancilla Theologiae*, there also seems to be no task left for it.³ As we shall (in the end) see, this impression is confirmed in and by a book which explicitly treats the question of the Task of Metaphysics, namely Gracia's *Metaphysics and its Task* [1]. Let's quote (pp. 220-221):

Metaphysics is an adventure in the clarification of thought ... My view is quite simple. I claim that metaphysics is the part of philosophy that studies categories ... The reason metaphysics survives is not that it is concerned with being, God, transcendental reality, ultimate causes, or any of the other objects we have rejected as proper objects of metaphysics. Nor is the reason that in it humans find meaning for their lives or that metaphysics is natural for them. No, the reason metaphysics will never perish is that it is concerned with the most general categories and the relation of less general ones to them. ... Metaphysics is inescapable.

²This journal will surely take a special interest in precise definitions of both terms, *ontology*, and *metaphysics*. For, if the founders and editors understand these terms in the usual sense according to which Ontology is a part of Metaphysics (or, rather seldom, the other way around), then the title is homological to *The International Journal of Geometry and Mathematics*, or to *The International Journal of Cows and Mammals*.

³Formerly, when *Metaphysica* was an *Ancilla Theologiae*, Her task was to defend Christian Faith with all available conceptual weapons. This task was difficult and not at all contemptible, at least from the standpoint of Christian Faith.

Believe it or not: I did escape metaphysics, in particular, I escaped the metaphysics of Gracia's Most General Categories. My ensuing remarks on the passages just quoted could perhaps be corrected or modified because I have read only 80 percent of [1], i.e. the parts which I could somehow although not fully understand. The remaining 20 percent I could not understand at all; wherefore I gave up reading them after the first or second try. So, I repeat that my interpretation of the quoted passages has perhaps to be corrected by several passages in the text itself. In the **Appendix II**, I have listed some additional passages from [1].

(1) Concerning Clarification of Thought(s). I know that my thoughts are usually very clear. When they happen to be not clear enough, I never start to read in a metaphysical book, not even in the best of it, viz. F. Suarez' *Disputationes Metaphysicae*. Every science can be used to clarify our thought, e.g., astrology, entomology, theology, mathematics, biology — and perhaps also, to a certain degree, metaphysics as such, or at least metaphysical books. Therefore, to clarify thoughts is no *proprium* of metaphysics; it is no *proprium* of any other science. *Which thoughts* are to be clarified? Perhaps, metaphysics is an adventure in the clarification of metaphysical thought. But mathematics is, among other things, also an adventure in the clarification of thoughts. I suspect that Gracia is not aware of the fact that pretended *clarification of thought* is usually the very last refuge of desperately confused philosophers, especially metaphysicians, when they fail to say anything at all. By the way, even if you have totally clarified two hundreds of hitherto confused thoughts (or notions, ... in your own brain or in the brains of other people), then you still have no theory, no knowledge, no new truth; then you are still only a wishy-washer. The big (and interesting!) question for what purposes "humans" need (clear and also confused) thoughts, concepts, notions, categories, and the like, has not yet been answered by metaphysics, *a fortiori* not by Gracia. If you want to cease to be a wishy-washer you have to use your thoughts (notions,...) to formulate sentences, i.e. assertions, in a logically perspicuous language, you have to set up a notion of truth, and you have to show that your assertions are not only true, but also non-trivial — in the sense that they really enhance human knowledge.

(2) Now for Gracia's simple (!) view, namely that metaphysics studies categories. Several questions arise: what has *the study* of categories to do with *the clarification* of thought? Needless to say that "category" is not meant in the mathematical sense here. In the book itself, I did only encounter the usual philosophical (or ontological) categories which are, as ever-

REVIEWS

Benjamin Schnieder, *Substanzen und (ihre) Eigenschaften. Eine Studie zur analytischen Ontologie*. Verlag Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 2004. XVIII + 390 Seiten, ISBN 3-11-018155-X, EUR 29,95.

Das Buch, hervorgegangen aus der Dissertation des Autors, ist eine virtuose Übung in deskriptiver Metaphysik. „Möglichst weite und allgemeine Arten von Gegenständen“, denen „eine grundlegende Rolle in unserer begrifflichen Weltorientierung zukommt“ (Einleitung, XV) sollen als „ontologische Kategorien“ ausgezeichnet und untersucht werden. Welche sind das? Man könnte nun erwarten und darauf gespannt sein, dass sich eine Antwort auf diese Frage im Fortgang der Analyse allmählich herauschält. Allein, die Spannung verpufft (erst einmal), denn es steht von Anfang an fest, dass es die folgenden drei sind: *Attribute* (universale Eigenschaften), *Adhärenzen* (partikularisierte Eigenschaften) sowie *Substanzen* (individuelle Lebewesen und die *medium-sized dry goods* der Alltagswelt). Entsprechend ist auch die Dreiteilung des Buches. Allerdings zeigt sich im Fortgang der subtilen Analysen, die viel Sprachwitz und ein ausgeprägtes Gespür für die wohlgeformte Ausdrucksweise im Deutschen zeigen, dass Schnieder mit seinen drei Kategorien und ihren Beziehungen zueinander durchaus systematische Intentionen verfolgt.

Mit Substanzen und Eigenschaften treffen wir auf alte Bekannte der kategorialen Analyse seit der Antike. Überraschend ist eventuell, dass *zwei* Arten von Eigenschaften als grundlegend erachtet werden – universale und partikulare – und, vielleicht wichtiger noch, dass das Buch nicht mit der gemäß der aristotelischen Tradition primären Substanz beginnt, sondern mit der Erörterung qualitativer Bestimmungen, während das Substanz-Kapitel ans Ende rückt. Bereits diese Anordnung lässt sich als ein Zeichen deuten, dass Substanzen ihren Status als erste Kategorie einbüßen. Mehr noch, sie wirken ein bisschen wie Sherpas, unentbehrlich zwar, aber letztlich werden sie bloß als Träger von Eigenschaften benötigt (244, 249).

Es ist häufig nicht so klar, was Philosophen meinen, wenn sie sich zur „deskriptiven Metaphysik“ bekennen. Wollen sie damit sagen, dass eine ontologische Analyse methodisch mit einer Sprachanalyse zu beginnen hat oder sich sogar darin erschöpft? Wollen sie sich als moderate Bewahrer der Tradition (welcher?) ausgeben und sich von (einigen oder allen?) „revisionistischen“ Ansätzen abgrenzen? Oder nur Peter Strawson zustimmen, der diese Unterscheidung populär gemacht hat?

Benjamin Schnieder hält sich mit solchen Fragen nicht groß auf, sondern fängt einfach an. Da gibt's interessante (wenngleich wohlbekannt) Phänomene in einem Fragment der deutschen Sprache zu beschreiben und linguistisch-logisch zu analysieren, z.B., dass Eigenschaften (Beschaffenheiten, So-und-so-Sein) nicht bloß als Adjektive oder Adverbien auftreten, sondern auch, und nicht zu knapp, in substantivierter Form. Aus „spontan“ wird der singuläre Eigenschaftsterm „Spontaneität“, aus „mutig“ der „Mut“. Und wenn man genauer hinsieht, finden sich aus fast allen sprachlichen

Partikeln und Formen (Appositionen, Infinitive, Satznominalisierungen) entstandene singuläre Terme für Eigenschaften (52). Wenn sich also in der deutschen Umgangssprache eine so ubiquitäre Verwendung von Eigenschaftsnamen findet, dann, so offenbar die Überlegung des Autors, ist es wohl gerechtfertigt, das damit Bezeichnete oder ‚Signifizierte‘ (so Schnieders *terminus technicus*) auch ontologisch ernst zu nehmen. Für die Priorität von Attributen seien drei Pluspunkte zu verbuchen: (a) ihre Generalität, (b) ihre häufig unmittelbare Beziehung zu den Begriffen, mit denen wir Eigenschaften erfassen, und (c) die Erklärungsleistung, die in den Attributen steckt. Gerade (b) scheint ins Gewicht fallen, weil der Autor, wie anfangs erwähnt, Kategorien danach auszeichnet, welche Funktion ihnen in unserer *begrifflichen Weltorientierung* zukommt. Auch unter den anderen Punkten gibt es subtile Beobachtungen, z.B. hinsichtlich Formen der einfachen Prädikation (*a ist F*) und Formen der expliziten Eigenschaftszuschreibung (*a hat F-heit*). Wer das „Haben“ oder „Besitzen“ von Eigenschaften nicht nur sprachanalytisch, sondern auch *ontologisch* gleichsam beim Wort nimmt, ist auf eine Kategorie der Besitzerin oder des Trägers von Eigenschaften programmiert (75 ff., zusammenfassend 150-152). Bündeltheorien sind somit keine Option; Substanzen oder Substrate müssen allemal zur Verfügung stehen.

Warum sind in der Welt der Eigenschaften zusätzlich zu den (universalen) Attributen auch noch (partikulare) Adhärenzen für den Autor von Interesse, und warum wird der kategoriale Name „Adhärenz“ präferiert? Schnieder listet kommentierend zunächst das „Sammelsurium von Bezeichnungen“ für partikulare Eigenschaften auf (155-161) und bevorzugt den von Bernard Bolzano verwendeten Begriff, nicht ohne Schelte gegen den von Donald Williams 1953 eingeführten Terminus „trope“ und insbesondere seine Eindeutschung als „Trope“.¹ Abgesehen von dieser kleinen terminologischen und vielleicht stilistischen *querelle* ist in der Sache keine besondere Distinktion von Akzidenzien, Modi, Momenten oder Tropen beabsichtigt. Sie sind Einzeldinge, aber fallen nicht zusammen mit letztdeterminierten Spezies und haben in der Regel eine zeitliche, häufig auch räumliche Existenz (164-65). Der interessante Punkt ist nun, dass Schnieder gemäß diesen minimalen Bestimmungen der Adhärenzen (etc.) versucht, zugleich die Kategorie der *Ereignisse* unterzubringen, nämlich als Unterklasse der „dynamischen Eigenschaften“. Ereignisse sind somit eine besondere Art von

¹ Schnieder findet die englischen „tropes“ vielleicht gerade noch passabel, aber die deutschen „Tropen“ gehörten zur Werbesprache von Reisebüros und zur Urlaubsphantasie deutscher Touristen. Da er meine Eindeutschung aufs Korn nimmt, hier ein Wort der Erklärung, wenn nicht der Rechtfertigung. (1) Schnieder hat recht: Mit „Tropen“ wird von den meisten deutschsprechenden Leuten eine Klimazone (im übrigen, nicht immer positiv) assoziiert, zudem von in der Literatur und Liturgie gebildeten Leuten als eine rhetorische Figur verstanden. (2) Schnieder hat nicht recht: *tropos* ist griechisch u.a. das Wort für „Art und Weise, Beschaffenheit“. Daß Aristoteles von den *symbebekôta* spricht und nicht von *tropoi*, wenn er *Akzidenzien* meint, ist der Dialektik seiner kategorialen Ontologie (zumindest gemäß der *Kategorien-schrift*) geschuldet, die qualitative Bestimmungen als *beiläufig* und *relativ zu einer ersten Substanz (ousia)* bestimmt. Es gibt somit einen durchaus respektablen griechischen Ursprung, der genau das - die Beschaffenheit, die Qualität - bezeichnet. Man hätte daher im Deutschen vom ‚Tropos‘ und im Plural von ‚Tropoi‘ reden können. Mir erschien das damals, als wir darüber debattierten, als zu gestelzt und bevorzugte die feminine Variante „die Trope“ in Analogie zu „die Qualität“. Mein bevorzugter Terminus ist jedoch „die individuelle Qualität“.

Adhärenzen. Dabei warnt der Autor, m.E. zu Recht, davor, dynamische Eigenschaften mit zeitweiligen und statische mit permanenten Eigenschaften gleichzusetzen (172): „Sokrates war nicht von Kindesbeinen an weise, also war Weisheit eine seiner zeitweiligen Eigenschaften, aber sie war nicht dynamisch“ (173).

Ein größeres Problem ist es nun, die Relation der Adhärenzen zu (a) den Attributen einerseits, (b) den Trägern der Adhärenzen (und nicht bloß der Attribute) andererseits auszuloten. Schnieder macht das sehr umsichtig und erfinderisch, weiß in der Regel, was er aufgrund vorheriger Entscheidungen machen kann und was nicht. Aufgrund einer semantischen Analyse „kanonischer Adhärenzterme“ wird eine „Trägerspezifität“ ausgezeichnet, die jedoch nicht mit der Attribut-Trägerschaft in eins fallen darf. Vermieden werden muß, dass mehr als ein Träger für eine Adhärenz in Frage kommt. Ist z.B. die Schärfe dieses Messers nicht (auch, zugleich, eigentlich) die Schärfe dieser Klinge? Schnieder begibt sich hier mutig in mereologische Gewässer, taucht aber schnell und ohne gleichsam wirklich naß zu werden wieder auf, indem er sich auf das trockene Gelände der Sprache zurückzieht (197-215). Eine ontologische Rolle dabei spielt der Begriff der „Konstitution“ – und der ist notorisch umstritten. Fazit aus den Überlegungen ist, dass Adhärenzen abhängig sind von Entitäten, denen sie „(nicht-derivativ) inhärieren“ (213).

Zum Schluß die Substanzen. Schnieder hält sich nicht mit Präliminarien auf, sondern bearbeitet, was es seiner Analyse zufolge nunmehr zu bearbeiten gilt: die ontische Unabhängigkeit der Eigenschaftsträger. Zwei Ansätze werden zunächst gegeneinander abgewogen: die vor allem von Peter Simons inspirierte *modal-existentielle* Analyse und die von Kit Fine vorgeschlagene *essentielle* Bestimmung der ontologischen Un/Abhängigkeit. Schnieder favorisiert einen dritten, zeitweilig von Jonathan Lowe propagierten, Ansatz der *explanatorischen* Abhängigkeit. Massiv eingesetzt wird dabei ein existentieller „weil-Operator“, der den (erklärenden) Grund für die in Frage stehende Existenz von etwas abgeben soll. Es sei, so Schnieder, eine Pseudo-Erklärung, zu sagen, dass z.B. Belmondo (permanent) existiere, weil Belmondos Adhärenz, ein Mensch zu sein, existiere. Es funktioniere genau andersherum: Belmondos Menschsein existiere, weil er ein Mensch sei. Der letzte Teil des Buches und fast auch das Buch selbst endet dann entsprechend mit folgender Definition des Autors: *x* ist eine Substanz dann und nur dann, wenn *x* wirklich ist & es kein *y* gibt derart, dass *x* von *y* permanent explanatorisch abhängig ist (348).

Ich kann hier nicht in eine Diskussion über ontologische Un/Abhängigkeit einsteigen, aber soviel sei angemerkt. Ich bin nicht überzeugt, weder von einem ontischen weil-Operator noch von einer „explanatorischen“ Un/Abhängigkeit. Die postulierte Erklärungskraft scheint von zwei theoretischen Präsuppositionen abhängig zu sein:

(1) Abhängigkeit und Unabhängigkeit sind duale Begriffe; der eine ist durch den anderen qua Negation definierbar;

(2) Dependenz ist grundsätzlich eine asymmetrische Relation. Diese beiden Bedingungen führen folgerichtig dazu, eine Kategorie von unabhängig existierenden Entitäten zu suchen oder zu postulieren. Ausgeschlossen wird dadurch die Möglichkeit verschieden starker Interdependenzen (insbesondere im Bereich der Eigenschaften). Zugegeben: hier könnte der Verdacht aufkommen, in einen Abhängigkeitszirkel oder

einen endlosen Regreß zu geraten. Aber die Gefahr ist nicht so groß wie sie erscheint. Es käme darauf an, relativ abgeschlossene Abhängigkeitsstrukturen zu (re)konstruieren. Freilich würde man sich dann nicht mehr bloß an Fragmenten der (gegenwärtigen) deutschen Sprache oder sonst einer natürlichen Umgangssprache orientieren, sondern zum Schluß kommen, dass das Seiende sich nicht 1:1 auf den kontingenten Sprachgebrauch abbilden lasse oder aus diesem abzulesen sei, obwohl unsere jeweilige Sprache und unser damit verbundenes Sprachhandeln uns sicherlich einen Hinweis darauf gibt, was sich ontologisch zu analysieren lohnt.

Schnieder hat in seiner Arbeit ein solches Abhängigkeitsnetz, sowohl in ontologischer als auch in konzeptueller Hinsicht mit viel Esprit entworfen und gegen Einwände verteidigt: Demnach nehmen universale Eigenschaften (Attribute) den ersten Rang ein, gefolgt von deren Instanzen, welche die besondere, genauer, singuläre Weise der qualitativen Charakterisierung garantieren. Beide Arten von Eigenschaften sind abhängige Entitäten. Die Substanzen, schließlich, werden in dieser Dialektik als Eigenschaftsträger benötigt. Deren Unabhängigkeit bleibt allerdings Postulat.

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REVIEWS

David M. Armstrong, *Truth and Truthmakers*. Cambridge University Press, 2004, xii, 158 pp., ISBN: 0521547237, Paperback, £17.99.

A truth-maker is what Russell long ago took to be that which *makes true* what *is true*—be the latter, a judgment, belief, proposition, sentence, etc. He generally thought of the truth-makers, or “verifiers” as he also called them, as facts and did not consider *making true* or *verifying* as a relation obtaining between makers and bearers of truth. Armstrong, like many in the current metaphysical revival, does think of *truth-making* as a relation with any (existent) “object” or “entity,” be it a particular, a universal, or a state of affairs, being a truth-maker for the truth that it exists.

At the outset of the book Armstrong speaks of propositions, not sentences or specific intentional states, as basic truth-bearers, and for long familiar reasons: there are truths, and falsehoods, that have not been thought of, hence we can take neither actual states of belief or judgment nor sentence tokens to be the basic bearers of truth. Furthermore, again like Russell, he finds propositions, true or false, suspicious entities—problematic inhabitants of the spatio-temporal world. He suggests that an adequate account of “possibility” will remove the problematic entities—as one will deal with *possible beliefs*, etc.,. Though he postpones that discussion until the end of the book, I will proceed to that directly, as one can only take up a few of the many substantial issues Armstrong addresses with his characteristic clarity.

His move is amazingly simple, and it is one that he has set out previously. He sees the problem that he must resolve to be supplying the truth-maker for a truth of possibility—“it is possible that ...” —while avoiding acknowledging any ontological ground for such a modal claim—a possible, but not actual, fact, for example. Thus he focuses on giving a “truth-maker” account for “it is possible that not-p.” The idea is that given a factual truth, p , p entails \langle it is possible that not- p \rangle ,¹ which Armstrong takes to be supported by the S-5 theorem “ $\Box(p \supset \Diamond p)$.” He does not bother that “ $\Box(\Box p \supset \Diamond p)$ ” is also such a theorem, which he should take as pointing to an obvious lack of “support” for his theme. This is emphasized if one thinks of his “ p entails \langle it is possible that not- p \rangle ” as transcribed by “ $\Box(p \supset \Diamond \neg p)$.” P. Simons (2005) has observed that Armstrong appeals to classical entailment to argue for his Possibility Principle that if T makes p true, where p is a contingent truth, then T makes \langle possible not- p \rangle true and

¹ He uses the angle brackets to “pick out propositions” and mentions he was introduced to the device by P. Horwich. (Though Armstrong does not use them with the single letter “ p ” or with “not- p ” in “ p entails \langle it is possible that not- p \rangle ”, I will sometimes do so for clarity.) The device goes back to the much earlier 1940s-50s use of quotation-marks and, subsequently, corner brackets by G. Bergmann (for “propositional characters”) and dot quotes by W. Sellars (for “semantic roles”), and, years later, “Fregean quotes” by D. Kaplan.

held that Armstrong's argument is invalid. This relates to the obvious falsehood of " $\Box(p \supset \Diamond \neg p)$ " put in terms of "entailment."

Another aspect of the problem is that there is not a clear use of "entails" or "necessitates" by Armstrong. For he obviously employs *entails* along with a second (and possibly a third and fourth) basic notion of "necessity" and shifts between them in diverse contexts. This recalls an old matter in the history of logic—Aristotle's purported two-fold use of *possibility*: one compatible with *being necessary*; another in the sense of *contingent*, and hence not necessary. A further aspect is the oddity of explaining away an appeal to a modality by appealing to another modality which is supposedly supported by a modal calculus that takes at least one primitive modal notion for granted. (*Possible worlds* and a "semantics" they may supply are of no help in this regard.) As Armstrong seeks to explain away *possibility* by appealing to the *contingency* of *propositions*, he starts with a notion of *contingency* as an attribute of propositional entities. He then takes the truth-maker, T, for p, to also be the truth maker for $\langle p \text{ is contingent} \rangle$, where that does not state that a statement expressing p is neither logically true nor false, in a standard sense of "logical truth."

Let the state of affairs Fa be a truth-maker for $\langle Fa \rangle$. Fa (or some other truth-maker of $\langle Fa \rangle$) must account for that proposition being contingent, i. e. the state of affairs Fa *necessitates* that both $\langle \langle Fa \rangle \text{ is contingent} \rangle$ and $\langle Fa \rangle$ are true. The problem lies in the explanation of why that is so. He takes it for granted, and speaks accordingly, that even though the state of affairs exists or obtains, it need not have—it is not a necessary being but a contingent one. The *contingency* of the state of affairs is then purportedly "passed on" to the true proposition, $\langle Fa \rangle$, and $\langle Fa \rangle$'s being contingent grounds the truth of $\langle \langle \text{not-Fa} \rangle \text{ is possible} \rangle$. Moreover, while states of affairs may not have a property of existence, the state of affairs, Fa, does appear to exemplify *being contingent*—or, perhaps, *being a contingent existent*. This is clarified in his 2006 paper where he suggests that the contingency of a truth-maker T is a non-relational, intrinsic characteristic of T, and thus that T carries its contingency within itself. Thus, as *contingency* is *intrinsic* to T ($=Fa$), it is *necessary that T is contingent*, and, as contingency is a modality, it would appear that at least one modality is taken as a basic entity (characterized, if "hesitatingly," as a property) that is "intrinsic" to other entities, such as T. But he does not specify how *contingency's* being intrinsic is to be understood. Is it, for example, a "constituent" property of what is contingent?

If *contingency*, be it a property, connective, operator, etc., is *intrinsic* to T as a constituent of T, it is clear that a fundamental modal entity is appealed to in his account. It would thus be misleading to think he accounts for the truth of " $\langle \text{not-Fa} \rangle$ is possible" simply in terms of a *non-modal* state of affairs, Fa. If there really is no basic constituent modal entity, how can his appeal to the "intrinsic" (and, hence, *necessary*) contingency of Fa be understood?

Armstrong takes there to be a "trans-categorial relation" between a truth-maker, say T, and a truth-bearer, say $\langle Fa \rangle$, a relation *going from* the first to the second, so to speak. That relation he speaks of as "necessitation" and distinguishes it from logical "entailment"—a relation between propositions. This raises a familiar question about another sense of "possibility" that has long been involved in discussions of realistic

theories of truth like his own—a sense involved in the notion of a “possible fact” or “situation.” The issues do not arise merely in connection with false judgments. In that the proposition $\langle Fa \rangle$ *indicates* the truth-maker Fa , irrespective of the former being true or false and, hence, irrespective of whether the latter exists or does not, they arise in connection with Armstrong’s:

- (N) p (a proposition) is true if and only if there exists a T (some entity in the world) such that T necessitates that p and p is true in virtue of T .

This is said not to define “is true” but to give a proposition’s “truth condition”—“a necessary and sufficient condition for truth.” That aside, the use of “ T necessitates that p ” and “ p is true in virtue of T ” raise further questions about the apparent *necessity* of truths of such forms—truths regarding a purported *necessitation connection* between the bearers and the makers of truth, as well as those about propositions and possibilities. He attempts to deal with the former by taking the necessitation connection as an “internal” relation and, hence, one that “will demand only the truth maker and the true proposition...” (50) But a story of the how and why of it all is not presented, except for the indication that propositions are properties of token beliefs and statements. Probing any deeper would involve going into the philosophy of mind and language. (13-14) Thus, for purposes of the book, he simply takes a proposition as a common characteristic of intentional states—a characteristic that supplies or is the “content,” to use a traditional term he also employs.

However the story about propositions and *necessitation*, as an internal relation, might be elaborated, linking such propositional properties to possible states of affairs involves further issues about modality and a further sense of “possible.” Those problems faced the realistic accounts of truth and the intentionality of thought in early writings of Moore and Russell (as well as in the *Tractatus*) and of members of the Austrian tradition.² They are not squarely faced in this book, and one wonders if the newly fashionable notion of a “truth-maker” invites not clearly separating, and thus not answering, the questions raised by the need to connect a proposition like $\langle Fa \rangle$ to the *possibility*, Fa , that it represents. For Armstrong’s talk of truth-makers has involved focusing on truth “supervening” on being, on maximal and minimal truth-makers, and on supervening entities as existent, but not real “additions to being.” In any case, there is no need to introduce a supposedly internal necessitation relation as Armstrong and other truth-maker advocates do. We can capture the idea of truth-making, and of what others have spoken of as an ontological ground of truth, by taking a purported truth-maker, the state of affairs Fa , to make the truth-bearer, $\langle Fa \rangle$, true, with “is true” as a suitably *introduced* truth predicate, as follows:

² In this connection one may also recall Bergmann’s “logical” relation of “meaning” and Moore’s taking clauses like “that- p ” to represent both the relevant propositions and the (possible) fact. Russell took another route seeking to explicitly avoid *possibilities* via his use of definite descriptions.

(TM) $\langle Fa \rangle$ is true $\supset \{Fa \text{ makes-true } \langle Fa \rangle \leftrightarrow . Fa \text{ exists} \ \& \ \langle Fa \text{ exists} \rangle \text{ entails } \langle \langle Fa \rangle \text{ is true} \rangle\}$.

(Armstrong's way of specifying the relevant "truth condition" doesn't yield the appropriate T-sentence. (TM), by contrast, simply makes use of "is true" as it presupposes a satisfactory way of defining "is true" or of giving "conditions" governing *its use--not the use* of "makes true.") Such a statement simply specifies or stipulates the use of the phrase "makes true" in context—as Armstrong and others suggest, in diverse ways, about "is true." "If one follows the pattern of (TM), "necessitates" is understood in terms of logical entailment. One thereby dispenses with the apparatus of a truth-making relation, though one must connect the truth-bearers to the "situations" they represent and viably resolve the issues about such purported possibilities and propositions. Russell's theory of descriptions provides a key mechanism for doing that without ontological extravagance.

In another major discussion in the book, Armstrong resurrects a variant of a "bundle" analysis of particulars. He takes the particular objects to be "partially identical" with the properties they instantiate; "... *a*'s being F being necessary because *a* and universal F intersect, and are thus partially identical." (49) He takes the state of affairs to be "built into the two constituents of the state of affairs." Not much is said about "intersects" though it is put in quotes at one place and distinguished from "overlaps." It supposedly dispenses with the need for an "exemplification" tie and, with that, Bradley's ghost, as it is a variant of the idea that universals require particulars (and vice versa). But it is either unclear—simply declaring a "necessary connection" to hold, or clearly paradoxical, suggesting that particulars and universals somehow mutually contain each other. As he puts it in describing D. Baxter's view, which inspires his new account of predication:

"Properties are ... ones that run through a plurality of particulars....But we also need the conception of particulars as ones that run through a plurality of universals. (48)

He makes it clear that his view does not reduce particulars to universals, since the "particularity of particulars is irreducible" (105)—being a basic "factor of particularity" (2006). One gets an idea of this if one thinks in terms of an ordinary particular being ontologically assayed as a bundle or complex of properties together with such a "thisness" or "bare individuator." Thus he adopts a view that appeared to Russell as an apparent problem of the 1940 bundle account—a view that seems to transform predications into necessities since a particular's properties function as constituent parts. Consequently, if an actual instantiation had not held, the particular would not be the respective particular that it is. Taking the universals as *parts*, Armstrong declares that they are partially identical with the particulars.

By the supposed symmetry of partial identity, the universals, as partially identical with their particulars, must then qualify just those particulars to be the universals they are. Yet it will not do to hold that a particular is a part of the universal that is a

part of it—unless “part,” like “runs through,” is simply a metaphor to anchor the “necessity” he seeks. But if the mutual inherence is not there, he has no basis for the claim that a universal would not be the universal it is if it were not instantiated by a particular that in fact instantiates it. Speaking of such a case, he writes: “*Equally, it now seems to me, the universal F would not have existed. A universal very like F could have existed...But that would have only been a close counterpart of F.*” (47) Forced to choose between taking a *thick* particular (factor of particularity + universal properties) to have its universal properties as “parts,” while the properties have the former as “parts,” or simply declaring that the “symmetry” of *partial identity* grounds the mutual necessitations involved, he has no way out. For there is no symmetry at all with respect to the one thing being a part of the other.

To retain an aspect of the contingency of predication Armstrong notes that while predications are “necessary” it is contingent that a specific particular exists—that there exists a certain bundle or complex in Russell’s terms. (Recall that “the ϕ is ϕ ” is not, though “the ϕ exists \supset the ϕ is ϕ ” is, a *Principia*-style theorem). What he doesn’t focus on is that a *particular* “factor of particularity” (a bare particular, a “thisness”) combines with the universals to form the complex.³ Thus one is back to an unanalyzed aspect of “predicative combination” (mereology won’t help him here) as well as its fundamental contingency. In short, on a view embracing individuating simple (bare, thin) particulars (or “factors”) and universal properties as “parts,” questions about their combination (connection, compresence) arise.

In the book, while internal relations disappear into their terms (51-52), he indicates that he seeks to apply the pattern of “necessary predication” to external relations. That results, in the 2006 paper, in his taking a mereological sum of the relata as *the* term for a “structural” *monadic* property that replaces the relation—a property that by its “structure” will provide places for the right number of terms. But as a mereological sum does not involve order, he must get the right term in the right place—he must order them. He hopefully speculates that all basic relations might be symmetrical. But even if that were true, when we examine what he has in mind by a structural monadic property, we discover that relations are involved after all—as in his example of the structural property of a knife (a mereological sum of a blade and a handle) “having a blade and a handle standing to each other in this way.”

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³ While noting the obvious link between his “thin” particulars and the “bare particulars” of others, he finds the latter phrase misleading. (105-106)

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